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The Methane Age and Beyond 
NebojSa Nakibenovib* 
Abstract 
The combustion of fossil fuels results in the emissions of gases and pollutants that pro- 
duce adverse ecological effects. Evidence is also accumulating that suggest they may also 
cause global climate change. The combustion gases that are connected with global cli- 
mate change are primarily carbon dioxide (C02)  and to a lesser degree methane (CH4) 
(see Cole this volume). All of these gases already occur in low concentrations in the atmo- 
sphere and, in fact, together with other greenhouse gases, such as water vapor, have made 
the earth habitable. The risk, however, is that the additional emissions of greenhouse 
gases associated with energy-use and other human activities are rapidly increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of these gases and may therefore lead to an additional global 
warming during the next century. While the greenhouse gases that result from energy-use 
are the most important cause of these concerns, the energy gases also offer a potential 
solution to this problem. 
Natural gas consists mostly of methane and is a very potent greenhouse gas if released 
into the atmosphere, but after combustion occurs, the amount of carbon dioxide resulting 
is much smaller per unit primary energy in comparison to other fossil energy sources. 
Natural gas emits roughly one-half of the carbon dioxide in comparison to coal for the 
equal amount of energy. Thus, a possible shift to a methane economy during the next 
decades offers a genuine mitigation strategy. Beyond that, natural gas could pave the 
way for more environmentally compatible energy systems of the distant future that could 
use hydrogen and electricity, both of which are carbon-free energy carriers, that could 
be produced by non-fossil sources of primary energy. This transition to the methane age 
and beyond to carbon-free energy systems would enhance the reduction of other adverse 
impacts on the environment by human activities. 
In fact, carbon dioxide emissions represent the largest mass flow of waste in comparison 
to all other anthropogenic activities. Current energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
are in the order of 6 gigatons of carbon (GtC) or more than 20 GtC02. This is more 
than 20 times larger than, for example, global steel production of about 700 megatons 
(Mt). Decarbonization is a notion that denotes reduction of carbon dioxide emissions 
per unit primary energy and unit economic activity, and dematerialization refers to the 
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reduction of materials used per unit economic activity. Decarbonization would also help 
reduce the emission of other energy pollutants and wastes, and it would also enhance 
the dematerialization in general. Other measures that would lead to decarbonization, 
in addition to a shift to methane economy, include efficiency improvements and energy 
conservation, carbon removal and storage or a shift to carbon-free sources of energy, such 
as solar and nuclear energy. 
From Resource Scarcity to Decarbonization 
In the aftermath of the so-called energy crisis of the early 1970s, a number of studies 
have been conducted to assess the long-term national and global energy prospects. In 
the wake of increasing energy prices and serious supply shortages, most of these studies 
focused on securing the long-term supply. Often they resulted in calls for commercializing 
large amounts of nonconventional fossil resources, such as oil shales, promoting nuclear 
power and fusion. A number of studies also considered renewable energy sources and 
solar energy as additional strategies for enhancing the supply of energy in the long run. 
In any case, the paradigm of oil shortage and depletion of conventional fossil resources 
predominated. 
As the sophistication of methodological approaches for analyzing energy futures increased, 
research also shifted to the questions of improving efficiency, end-use of energy and en- 
hancing conservation. The studies became more balanced in treating supply and demand. 
Today, the predominate question is how to reduce the adverse impacts of energy-use in 
the world while allowing for sufficient increase of energy services in the developing coun- 
tries. This is a formidable task considering that global population is expected to double 
during the next century and that 80 percent of humanity shares less than 20 percent of 
global wealth. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly evident that the fossil energy 
resources are much more abundant than it was anticipated in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Both resources and reserve bases of oil and natural gas have increased and, in fact, new 
natural gas discoveries have outpaced oil. The absolute finiteness of energy resources does 
not appear to be a problem facing humanity in the next few hundred years. The question 
is rather how to utilize the available energy resources in supplying adequate services while 
arresting the further environmental degradation and global warming. 
Figure 1 illustrates this dilemma of the need to increase energy services and reduce the ad- 
verse impacts of energy-use. It shows per capita emissions of carbon dioxide and methane 
for the major world regions. The height of the bars gives the carbon dioxide and methane 
per capita emission in tons of carbon equivalent, while the width of the bars shows the 
population of the region. Four main sources of the greenhouse gas emissions are shown: 
carbon dioxide emissions resulting from coal, oil and natural gas consumption, and the 
last division represents the combined carbon dioxide emissions of all non-fossil sources, 
such as biomass burning and also includes all of the anthropogenic methane sources, both 
energy and non-energy. 
The combined carbon dioxide and methane emissions are clearly the highest in the indus- 
trialized countries reaching 6 tons of carbon (tC) equivalent per capita in North America 
and Australia, and are not much lower in some parts of the former Eastern Europe and 
Soviet Union. For example, the eastern states of Germany that constituted the former 
German Democratic Republic had almost the same per capita carbon dioxide emissions 
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as the United States, but had a much lower standard of living and energy services. This 
was due to the high degree of inefficiency of the energy systems, a very high share of coal 
in the energy mix and a high level of material use per unit economic activity in general. 
This similar situation still exists in the economies of Eastern Europe, Russia and the other 
Commonwealth Republics. 
In contrast to the energy-intensive economies in Eastern Europe, Japan and Western 
European countries achieve much higher levels of economic activities with a substantially 
lower per capita energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. The standards of 
living in most of the West European countries are comparable to those of the United 
States meanwhile the emissions of greenhouse gases are half as large. The variation is in 
the order of 3 tC equivalent per capita in the more efficient industrial countries to twice 
that amount in North America. These regions constitute about 20 percent of the world 
population today. 
The other 80 percent of the world population accounts for only 20 percent of the global 
carbon dioxide and methane emissions. Figure 1 clearly shows this disparity in the emis- 
sions levels. For example, China with one billion people has combined carbon dioxide and 
methane emissions that barely exceed 1 tC per capita. It is also of interest to observe 
that the structure of the emissions is different in most developing countries in comparison 
to the industrialized countries. Using China again for an example we see that most of the 
emissions are due to coal consumption, non-fossil carbon dioxide and methane emissions 
indicating low shares of oil and natural gas in the primary energy mix. As the develop- 
ing countries continue to grow, the total emissions will increase and if the development 
process continues, per capita emissions will most likely also increase. The current plans 
in India and China are to expand the coal production and use reaching perhaps 3 Gt in a 
few decades. This source of carbon dioxide alone would represent half of the current total 
emissions. Therefore, it is quite apparent that the economic and social development in 
the world are strong determinants of future greenhouse gas emissions. The potential risks 
of climate change, on the other side, suggest a need to slow down the growth of emissions 
and even decrease them in the next century. There is a need to reconcile this opening gap 
between the energy needs for development and reduction of emissions as a precaution to 
guard against global warming. 
Energy Intensity and Decarbonization 
Global emissions will continue to increase along with further economic development and 
population growth in the world. The most important determinants of future energy- 
related carbon dioxide emissions could be represented as products of the following factors: 
population growth, per capita value added, energy per value added and carbon emissions 
per energy on one side, and total carbon dioxide emissions on the other side of the identity 
(Yamaji et al., 1991).' Two of these factors are increasing and two are declining at the 
global level. 
At present, the world's global population is increasing at a rate of about 2 percent per 
year. The longer-term historical growth rates since 1800 have been about 1 percent 
'C02 = (C02/E) x (EIGDP) x (GDPIP) x P ,  where E represents energy consumption, GDP the 
gross domestic product or value added, and P population. Changes in C 0 2  emissions can be described 
by changes in these four factors. 
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Figure 1: Industrial COz and other greenhouse gas emissions per capita, versus popula- 
tion, for different world regions and by energy source in tons of carbon per capita. Other 
greenhouse gases include C 0 2  from deforestation and anthropogenic methane emissions 
(1 kg CHI = 21 kg COz). 
per year. Most of the population projections expect at least another doubling during 
the next century e.g., World Bank (Vu, 1985) and United Nations Projections (1990). 
Productivity has been increasing in excess of global population growth since the beginning 
of industrialization and thus, has resulted in more economic activity and value added per 
capita. In contrast, energy intensity per unit value added has been decreasing at a rate of 
about 1 percent per year since the 1860s and at about 2 percent per year in most countries 
since the 1970s. Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy have also been decreasing 
but at a much lower rate of about 0.3 percent per year. 
Figure 2 shows the extent of decarbonization in the world as the change in the ratio of aver- 
age carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy consumed. It occurred due to the gradual 
replacement of carbon rich by carbon poorer sources of energy. First, wood and coal 
were replaced by oil and later natural gas and more recently to a lesser degree by nuclear 
energy. Figure 2 also illustrates decarbonization rates implicit in a number of global en- 
ergy scenarios. For example, the United States Environment Protection Agency's Rapidly 
Changing World (RCW) scenario actually anticipates an increase of carbon intensity in 
the world, and thus a trend reversal of the historical development (EPA, 1990). This is 
primarily due to a heavy reliance on coal in this scenario. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) has developed a whole range of scenarios, the median one is 
shown in Figure 2 and anticipates continuation of the current level of carbon emissions 
per unit energy consumed in the world (IPCC, 1992). The Environmentally Compatible 
Scenario (ECS'92) developed at IIASA in 1992 (NakiLenoviC et al., 1993) and the World 
Energy Council scenario (WEC, 1992) represent a continuation of the historical trends 
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Figure 2: Global decarbonization of energy since 1900 and scenarios for the future in tons 
of carbon per kilowatt year (tC/kWyr) of energy. Four future scenarios are shown: EPA's 
rapidly changing world, the IPCC Energy and Industry Subgroup's median scenario and 
IIASA's Environmentally Compatible Scenario as well as the World Energy Council's 
reference scenario with basically the same carbon intensity of energy. The lower dashed 
line symbolizes the need to achieve lower emissions. 
and thus, a certain degree of decarbonization in the future. The lower dashed line with 
the arrow into the future in Figure 2 symbolizes the need to achieve even higher rates of 
decarbonization in order to off set future population and economic growth in the world. 
A scenario that relies on the higher contribution of energy gases in primary energy con- 
sumption could achieve this goal and such a scenario will be described in this paper. To 
stabilize energy-related carbon emissions at current levels of almost 6 GtC for a primary 
energy demand between 15 and 18 Terawatt years (TWyr) by the year 2020, compared 
to 12 TWyr in 1992, the rate of decarbonization would have to range between 0.8 and 1.4 
percent per year, i.e., two to four times the rates achieved in the past. 
In addition to the decarbonization in energy, one must also consider the reduction of 
energy intensity in economic activities as a second factor that is also causing a decrease 
in the carbon dioxide emissions mentioned above. Figure 3 shows the historical decrease 
in energy intensity per unit value added in a number of countries. Energy development 
paths in different countries have varied enormously and consistently over long periods, but 
the overall tendency is toward lower energy intensities. For example, France and Japan 
have always used energy more efficiently than the United States, the United Kingdom or 
Germany. This should be contrasted with the opposite development in some of the rapidly 
industrializing countries, where commercial energy intensity is still increasing, such as in 
Nigeria. The present energy intensity of Thailand resembles the situation in the United 
States in the late 1940s. The energy intensity of India and its present improvement rates 
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Figure 3: Primary energy intensity, including biomass, of value added in Wyr per constant 
GDP in 1980 dollars. Primary electricity is accounted as 1 Wyr = 8.76 k w h  (equivalence 
method). 
0.2- 
are similar to those of the United States about a century ago. The reforming countries 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have relatively high energy intensities 
ranging between the United States and India on the high end. 
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Figure 4 shows the degrees of decarbonization and energy deintensification achieved in 
a number of countries since the 1870s. It illustrates salient differences in the policies 
and structures of energy systems among countries. For example, Japan and France 
have achieved the highest degrees of decarbonization; in Japan this has been achieved 
largely through energy efficiency improvements over recent decades, while in France 
largely through vigorous substitution of fossil fuels by nuclear energy. Most countries 
have achieved decarbonization through the replacement of coal first by oil, and later by 
natural gas. 
0 I 1 I I I I I I 1 I I 1 I 1 I 
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At the global level, the long-term reduction in carbon intensity of value added has been 
about 1.3 percent per year because decarbonization of energy occurs at  about 0.3 percent 
per year and reduction of energy intensity of value added at  about 1 percent per year. 
This falls short of what is required to offset the effects of global economic growth, with 
rates of about 3 percent per year. This means that the global carbon dioxide emissions 
have been increasing at about 1.7 percent per year during most of this century. Today, 
global carbon dioxide emissions are still increasing at  close to  2 percent per year implying 
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Figure 4: Global decarbonization and deintensification of energy in kg of C per kg oil- 
equivalent (kgoe), and in kgoe per $1000 GDP (Griibler, 1991). 
a doubling before the 2030s and this is in fact quite close to the emissions levels projected 
in some of the global scenarios. 
Figure 5 gives an overview of the major energy scenarios for the world. It shows the current 
energy-related carbon emissions of almost 6 GtC in 1990 and the anticipated development 
of emissions during the next three decades. It shows the EPA's RCW scenario with highest 
emissions exceeding 10 GtC by 2020 (EPA, 1990). It shows again the IPCC mid-range 
scenario with slightly lower emissions, although it should be mentioned here that the 
lowest IPCC scenarios actually lead to a reduction of global emissions with respect to 
1990 during the next the century (IPCC, 1992). Figure 5 also shows the WEC reference 
scenario and the ECS'92 scenario from IIASA in the lower range (NakiCenoviC et  al., 
1993). 
The shaded area represents what could be called 'the consensus viewn of future energy 
emissions. This range of emissions is based on assessments of the International Energy 
Workshop (IEW). Since 1981, Stanford University and IIASA have jointly organized a 
series of IEW Workshops with the aim of comparing energy projections made by different 
groups around the world and analyzing their differences (Manne and Schrattenholzer, 
1992). The projections are analyzed on the basis of a standardized poll. The median 
response derived from the polls corresponds, in our interpretation, to the "consensus viewn 
and reflects the "conventional wisdomn of the international energy community. These 
projections mostly describe surprise-free, business-as-usual, middle-of-the-road scenarios. 
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Figure 5: Global primary energy consumption 1990-2020; range of IIASA's IEW projec- 
tions and the scenarios including EPA's RCW, WEC reference scenario, IPCC/IRS9la, 
IIASA's ECS'92 and IIASA's CHALLENGE G2100. 
According to the results of the most recent IEW poll (Manne and Schrattenholzer, 1992), 
today's projections anticipate a more modest growth of global primary energy consump- 
tion between now and the year 2020 than the long-term trend of 2 percent per year. The 
JEW median projection corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 1.4 percent, 
which would lead to an absolute increase from 11.8 to 18 TWyr/yr. 
Together the IEW projections comparisons show that the energy community is anticipat- 
ing a substantial increase in global carbon dioxide emissions during the next 30 years, 
the median represents an increase of more than 30 percent. On the other hand, the in- 
ternational assessments such as the IPCC process clearly point to the need to reduce the 
emissions to the extent possible. Furthermore, the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change that was signed by 153 countries at the Rio de Janiero Summit in 1992, to be 
ratified in the near future, calls for reduction of emissions as a precautionary principle 
toward arresting climate change (International Negotiating Committee, 1992). 
Carbon Dioxide Mitigation 
There are basically three courses of action as far as energy is concerned in this context. 
First is to mitigate the emissions in the future, the second is to deal with the adverse im- 
pacts of climate change such as to compensate for incurred damages, and the last one is to 
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adapt to climate change such as to learn to live in warmer weather. All of these alternatives 
are surrounded by numerous uncertainties. Mitigation measures and options have been 
studied in greater detail than impacts and adaptation. In this paper, mitigation strategies 
that involve greater use of energy gases in the future with the intention of reducing emis- 
sions of greenhouse gases will be considered. For completeness, a brief overview of other 
mitigation options will be given. The technological and economic measures to minimize 
energy-related greenhouse gases emissions include efficiency improvements, conservation, 
enhanced use of low-carbon fuels, carbon-free sources of energy and other options such as 
afforestation, enhancement of natural carbon sinks and creation of new ones. Thus, they 
encompass the whole energy system from primary energy extraction to actual energy-use 
including various conversion, transport, distribution and end-use systems. 
Four types of technological strategies can be distinguished for stabilizing and eventually 
also reducing energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. The first is an incremental one, 
emphasizing energy efficiency improvements (see also Mills, this volume). In this case, 
devices or operational practices are replaced by more efficient ones without major changes 
in the technology of the device itself or technologies upstream of the energy chain. For 
example, this could mean replacing a refrigerator or a gas-fired power plant by more 
efficient vintages while using the same electricity and fuel supply chains. Three other 
strategies are more radical. They include changes in technologies design and operational 
practices with and without changes in the energy chains. These are changes in technolog- 
ical "trajectories". In the simplest case, the end-use technology is changed but with the 
same upstream energy chain, e.g., switching from a gasoline to diesel car. Alternatively, 
the end-use and conversion technologies may stay the same but the primary energy input 
changes, such as switching from an oil to a gas-fired combined-cycle power plant. Finally, 
it is possible to change the trajectories of end-use, conversion and primary energy supply 
technologies (e.g., the whole energy chain), such as switching from a gasoline car with oil 
as the primary energy source to an electric vehicle with photovoltaic panels. 
There is a clear ranking of the four different technological strategies with regard to costs 
(Nakidenovid et  al., 1993). The incremental improvements have the lowest cost because 
they do not require changes in technological trajectories. These are also the easiest to 
implement and take the shortest time. They are followed by measures that involve a 
change in the primary energy source and those involving changes in end-use technologies. 
Generally, the most difficult and costly measures to implement will be those where both 
end-use and primary energy supply technologies have to be changed. Here, changes are 
required in all related components of the energy system, meaning that entirely new en- 
ergy chains have to be developed and built: new energy supply systems, infrastructures, 
diffusion of new end-use devices and delivery outlets. 
A similar conclusion also holds for carbon removal and disposal technologies. The more 
remote from the disposal site and diluted the source of emissions, the more difficult and ex- 
pensive are the carbon control measures. Again, demand-side measures such as improved 
efficiency and emission avoidance altoget her are cheaper than post-combustion scrubbing 
of stack gases which, in turn, is cheaper than carbon removal from the atmosphere by 
e.g., micro-algae carbon fixation. From this perspective, it is not surprising that most 
assessments of mitigation options identify energy efficiency improvements and end-use de- 
mand management measures amongst the most cost-effective measures, followed by fuel 
substitution. More traditional energy supply-side measures, or even extensive industrial 
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and infrastructural restructuring measures, are generally more difficult to implement and 
are certainly also more expensive. 
In this paper, implications for carbon dioxide and methane emissions of increasing reliance 
on combustion of natural gas in the future are considered. Although, natural gas (mostly 
methane) results in lower specific carbon dioxide emissions than other fossil fuels it has 
not been explored in detail as a mitigation strategy for arresting global warming. Often, 
reservations are expressed in connection with wider use of natural gas because methane is 
a potent greenhouse gas. We will demonstrate that a stronger reliance on natural gas in 
the future would lead to relatively modest increases in carbon dioxide emissions compared 
with scenarios that are based on more traditional mitigation strategies. We will also show 
that methane emissions do not pose a major problem provided that leakage rates could 
be maintained at least at levels of up to 4 percent or reduced in the future. 
Methane as an Energy Gas of Choice 
A global scenario with a major share of natural gas in primary energy is of interest 
for several reasons. First, the historical replacement of coal by oil and later by natural 
gas points in this direction. Primary energy substitution (Marchetti and NakiCenovid, 
1979 and NakiCenovid, 1990) suggest a likelihood that natural gas would in fact become 
globally the major source of energy during the next century. Second, new markets for 
natural gas appear to be opening also because it is more desirable than other fossil fuels 
with respect to the environment. Methane has the highest hydrogen to carbon atomic 
ratio and lowest carbon dioxide emissions of all fossil fuels. The historical transition 
from wood to coal to oil and to gas resulted in gradual decarbonization of energy or 
to an increasing hydrogen to carbon ratio of global energy consumption. Natural gas 
also highly desirable from the point of regional environment because of minimal sulfur 
dioxide and particulate emissions. Third, recent assessments suggest that gas resources 
may be more abundant than was widely believed only a decade ago. New discoveries 
have outpaced consumption. Additionally, gas-hydrates and natural gas of ultra-deep 
origin indicate truly vast occurrences of methane throughout Earth's crust (see Wymar; 
Gold; Korvalkin; this volume). There is an increasing evidence of multiple economic and 
geopolitical benefits from a worldwide shift to natural gas (Lee et  al., 1988). 
Figure 6 shows primary energy substitution in the world. The competitive struggle be- 
tween five main sources of primary energy is dynamic and quite regular so that it can be 
described by relatively simple rules (Marchetti and NakidenoviC, 1979; NakiCenoviC 1979 
and 1986). The dynamics of this process are captured by logistic equations that describe 
the rise of new energy sources and the senescence of old ones. The substitution process 
clearly indicates the dominance of coal as the major energy source between the 1880s and 
1960s after a long period during which fuel wood (and other traditional energy sources) 
were in the lead. The massive expansion of railroads, the growth of steel, steamships 
and many other sectors are associated with and based on the technological opportuni- 
ties offered by the mature coal economy. After the 1960s, oil assumed a dominant role 
simultaneously with the maturing of the automotive, petrochemical and other modern 
industries. 
Figure 6 projects natural gas as the dominant source of energy during the first decades of 
the next century, although oil still maintains the second largest share until the 2040s. For 
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Figure 6: Global primary energy substitution. Smooth lines represent model calculations 
and jagged lines are historical data. "Solfusn is a term employed to describe a major new 
energy technology, for example solar or fusion. 
such an explorative "lookn into the future, additional assumptions are required because 
potential new competitors, such as nuclear, solar and other renewables, have not yet 
captured sufficient market shares to allow estimation of their penetration rates. In order 
to explore the behavior of the logistic substitution model when the competition between 
energy sources is extended into the future, we assume that nuclear energy would diffuse 
a t  comparable rates to oil and natural gas half a century earlier. This implies that the 
current share of nuclear energy in the world would be unchanged for a decade when 
growth would resume but a t  a lower rate than in the past. Nevertheless, such a scenario 
would require a new generation of nuclear installations and today such prospects are 
a t  best questionable. This leaves natural gas with the lion's share in primary energy 
during the next fifty years. In the past, new sources of energy have emerged from time to 
time coinciding with the saturation and subsequent decline of the dominant competitor. 
"Solfusn is a term employed to describe a major new energy technology, for example solar 
or fusion that could emerge during the 2040s a t  the time that natural gas would saturate 
(Marchetti and Nakitenovit, 1979 and Nakitenovit 1990). 
Figure 6 demonstrates that the diffusion of new energy sources and the replacement of 
older by newer ones takes on the order of almost 100 years a t  the global level. All too 
often there is over-optimism about how rapid the diffusion of new technologies might be. 
The historography (history and geography) of technological change clearly demonstrates 
that the diffusion of innovations with some economic and social significance may take 
on the order of decades and sometimes even centuries. Longer periods are required for 
the pervasive transformation of economic activities by a whole cluster of technological 
and organizational innovations. The analysis of primary energy substitution and market 
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penetration suggests that natural gas would become the dominant energy source and 
remain so for half a century, perhaps to be replaced by carbon-free energy sources such 
as nuclear, solar or fusion. Thus, the primary energy substitution implies a gradual 
continuation of the decarbonization of energy in the world. The methane economy could 
represent a first step toward a carbon-free energy future. For this reason the dynamics 
of primary energy substitution is used as a scenario for determining carbon dioxide and 
methane emissions associated with a stronger reliance on natural gas as a fuel of choice 
in the future. This approach was employed more than 15 years ago to determine future 
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions scenarios and was used again a few years ago 
in a more comprehensive assessment of future carbon dioxide and methane emissions 
(Marchetti, 1979, Ausubel et al., 1988 and Victor, 1990). 
Market penetration and substitution analysis provides a method for calculating shares of 
different primary energy sources in the world. What is required is the scenario describing 
the levels of global primary energy consumption. Thereafter, the calculation of carbon 
dioxide emissions becomes a straightforward matter.2 
We examine a methane economy scenario with two overall levels of energy consumption 
in the world, both are population driven and based on the World Bank estimates (Vu, 
1985). One variant of the methane economy scenario, the "efficiency case", holds the per 
capita energy consumption at the current level so that the primary energy consumption 
increases the same as the world population. This leads to a primary energy consumption 
rate of about 20 TWyr/yr by the end of the next century when the population reaches 
10 billion. The second variant, the "long wave case", stipulates another growth pulse in 
per capita primary energy consumption leading to a three-fold increase by the end of the 
next century and to staggering levels of global primary energy consumption. The two 
cases cover a large domain encompassing between them some of the highest and lowest 
projections from the literature. Figure 7 shows the primary energy consumption in the 
two variants of the methane economy scenario. 
The carbon dioxide emissions are simply calculated as the product of the market shares 
of different energy sources (Figure 6), the scenario of global primary energy consumption 
(Figure 7) and individual emissions factors (given in footnote 2). Figure 8 shows the 
resulting carbon dioxide emissions for the two cases. In the efficiency variant, emissions 
stay roughly constant over the next 50 years, peaking shortly before 2050 and falling 
thereafter. The results of this case are close to the lowest of the IPCC scenarios and 
consistent with gradual stabilization of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (IPCC, 
1992). In the long-wave case, emissions peak steeply at a level close to 15 GtC per year 
shortly before 2050 and also decline thereafter falling to 7 GtC in the year 2100. The 
two cases bracket virtually all reasonable scenarios of primary energy consumption in the 
future while they result in substantially lower carbon dioxide emissions. Because the same 
market shares are used for both variants, the scenario has the same carbon intensity of 
energy in both cases. In fact, it achieves high decarbonization rates in the world, higher 
than those experienced in the past (Figure 2) and higher than assumed in majority of 
other energy and carbon dioxide projections. 
2The following carbon dioxide emissions factors per unit energy (tce): Wood 0.844 tC/kWyr; coal 
0.735 tC/kWyr; Oil 0.849 tC/kWyr and natural gas 0.442 tC/kWyr (Ausubel et al., 1988). 
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Figure 7: Primary energy consumption, historical data and the two variants of the 
methane economy scenario. 
- 
Energy Scenarios and Decarbonization 
- 
Table 1 summarizes the structure of current primary and final energy supply and resulting 
carbon emissions as well as a range of scenarios for the period 2020 to 2025. As a measure 
of the degree of decarbonization, we calculate the primary energy carbon intensity, i.e., 
total energy-related carbon emissions divided by the total primary energy consumption. 
The efficiency case of the methane economy scenario is compared with five other scenarios. 
Two views of the future emerge from Table 1 (see also Figure 2). One view implies a 
discontinuity in the historically observed trend of decarbonization of energy systems. In- 
stead, the fuel mix becomes more carbon intensive. This is due to increased reliance on 
coal and synthetic fuel production in the scenarios. The EPA's RCW and (to a lesser 
degree) the IPCC/EIS scenario are examples (EPA, 1990 and EIS, 1991). A second view 
adopts basically a "dynamics-=-usualn perspective, which is a continuation of histori- 
cal trends in energy decarbonization as, for instance, reflected in the ECS'92 scenario 
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Figure 8: Global carbon dioxide emissions in GtC/yr, historical data and the two variants 
of the methane economy scenario, E denotes the efficiency and LW the long-wave variant. 
(NakiCenoviC et al., 1993) or the recent reference scenario of the World Energy Coun- 
cil (WEC, 1992). However, these improvements, as impressive as they are especially in 
comparison with other scenarios, are not sufficient to reverse the rising trend in global 
energy-related carbon emissions. Both scenarios still result in global emissions between 
8.1 and 8.4 GtC by the year 2020. 
In comparison, the methane economy scenario is more dynamic. Carbon intensity falls 
because the increased natural gas use "bridges" the time period to a massive market 
penetration of zero-carbon energy sources such as solar or nuclear in the second half 
of the 21st century. Table 1 reproduces the efficiency variant of the methane economy 
scenario. The implied energy efficiency improvement strategy results in a primary energy 
demand of only some 15 TWyr by the year 2025.3 This, together with a drastic shift 
in the energy supply structure (natural gas accounts for 68 percent of primary energy 
3Traditional biomass uses (currently estimated at 1.5 TWyr) are excluded in the scenario. If included, 
total energy demand would be quite close (10 to 15 percent lower) to the ECS'92 or the WEC scenario. 
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Table 1: Primary and final energy supply, carbon emissions and carbon intensity, 1990 
and scenarios for the period 2020 to 2025, in TWyr and GtC. 
IPCC/  EPA- WEC- IIASA "CH4 
EIS R C W  reference ECS'92 economy" RIGES 
1990 2025 2025 2020 2020 2025" 2025 
Prima y energy supply, T Wyr 
Cod 2.94 7.56 8.73 4.55 3.87 0.53 2.82 
Oil 4.19 7.07 4.96 5.26 6.20 1.92 2.43" 
Gas 2.22 5.48 3.09 3.95 3.92 10.59 2.95" 
Non-fossil 2.35 4.53 3.70 5.16 4.10 2 . 3 0 ~  7.06" 
T o t d  11.70 24.64 20.49 18.92 18.10 1 5 . 3 4 ~  >15.26" 
Final energy consumption, T Wyr 
C o d  1.22 3.28 4.09 n.a. 1.58 n.a. 2.16 
Oil 3.52 5.89 5.12 n.a. 5.06 n.a. 2.43 
Gas 1.42 4.04 2.52 n.a. 2.54 n.a. 1.87 
Electricity & heat 1.10 3.61 2.81 2.59 2.29 n.a. 2.42 
Other 1.20 1.08 - n.a. 1.37 n.a. 3.52 
Tot a1 8.46 17.90 14.54 n.a. 12.85 n.a. 12.40 
Carbon emission, GtC 
F i n d  energy use 3.02 7.77 7.31 n.a. 5.12 n.a. 3.95 
Energy sector 2.48 4.68 3.81 n .a. 3.53 n.a. 1.02 
Totala 5.50 12.45 11.12 8.40 8.06 6.16 4.97 
Carbon intensity (tC/kWyr) 
Primary energy 0.470 0.505 0.547 0.444 0.445 0.402 >0.330 
F i n d  energy 0.357 0.434 0.503 n.a. 0.398 n.a. 0.319 
"Efficiency scenario. 
' ~ x c l u d i n ~  biomass. 
'For oil, gas, geothermal, and intermittent renewables only secondary energy equivalent. Primary en- 
ergy requirements, therefore, would be higher. This uncertainty also affects the primary energy carbon 
intensity. 
supply by 2025), is reflected in carbon emissions of 6.2 GtC, i.e., basically a stabilization 
of current emission levels. 
A Renewables-Intensive Global Energy Scenario (RIGES) has been suggested by Johans- 
son et al., (1992). Final energy demand of 12.4 TWyr is similar to the ECS'92 scenario 
described above. RIGES suggests that renewables would be competitive against fossil 
fuels and could penetrate massively as primary energy supply. Sustainable biomass and 
other renewables account for close to 43 percent of primary/secondary energy supply 
(>15.3 TWyr) by the year 2025.4 It must be emphasized, however, that such a rapid 
market penetration of non-fossils in this scenario is without precedent for any primary 
energy source in history. For comparison, it took about 80 years for the market share 
of oil to grow to 40 percent of the global primary energy supply. The carbon emissions 
in RIGES would amount to  5 GtC per year, i.e., result in a stabilization (even slight 
reduction) of current energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. 
4Primary energy production is only given for biomass and coal. For nuclear and hydro we have assumed 
a substitution equivalent based on the average efficiency of fossil electricity generation in the scenario (40 
percent). For oil, gas, geothermal, and intermittent renewables only secondary energy equivalents are 
given. This also explains why the primary energy carbon intensity of RIGES is not presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 9: Atmospheric C 0 2  and CH4 concentrations from methane economy scenario 
expressed as C 0 2  equivalents in ppm. Simple models of C 0 2  and CHI concentrations 
and different values for CH4 forcing have been used for estimating C 0 2  equivalents of 
CH4 concentrations. Higher set of curves are for the long wave and lower ones are for the 
efficiency case. The lower dotted curves show only C 0 2  emissions, solid lines are C 0 2  and 
CH4 emissions for 2.5 percent leakage, and higher dotted curves for 4 percent leakage and 
high CH4 forcing. 
Methane and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Carbon dioxide is the major energy-related source of global warming and the most im- 
portant single greenhouse gas. Methane is also a natural constituent of air, arising from 
many natural processes. Recent increases in the concentration of atmospheric methane 
is usually attributed to diverse anthropogenic activities such as the growth of animal 
population, rice production and organic waste depositories. However, using methane in 
the energy system also contributes to the atmospheric increases. Major energy-related 
sources of methane come from coal mining, oil and natural gas production and natural 
gas transport, distribution and end-use (see Clayton and others, this volume). 
Figure 9 shows the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations that result from the 
methane economy scenario corrected for the methane leakage. Simple models of atmo- 
spheric carbon dioxide and methane concentrations have been used (Ausubel et al., 1988; 
Victor, 1990; and Griibler and Fujii 1991). For carbon dioxide, the airborne fraction of 
close to a half of annual emissions was used together with a slow decay of atmospheric 
concentrations. Methane leaks from the natural gas extraction, supply and distribution 
system are assumed to be 2.5 percent and methane is assumed 24 times as effective as 
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carbon dioxide in greenhouse forcing on volume basis. The dotted lines in Figure 9 are for 
two additional calculations, one without leakage of natural gas (methane emissions from 
coal are included) and a methane forcing of 16 (low case), and the other with 4 percent 
leakage and a methane forcing of 32 (high case).5 The atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide and methane are given in ppm of C 0 2  equivalents. For this calculation, 
methane concentrations are converted to C 0 2  equivalents using the methane conversion 
factors discussed above and methane atmospheric lifetime of 9.6 years. 
This sensitivity analysis of methane emissions inclusion indicates that the methane econ- 
omy scenario yields substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and that it is robust 
even when large methane leaks are included. However, it is also evident that the role of 
methane leaks is not trivial. As energy-use increases, especially in the long wave variant, 
the problem of methane leaks becomes more important (Victor, 1990). This means that 
the greenhouse forcing due to increased levels of energy consumption with the same struc- 
ture of the energy system is not linear. The finding identifies the additional advantage 
of lower energy scenarios toward the absolute and relative reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
The required acceleration of the rate of decarbonization over the ones achieved historically 
and projected for the future in most energy scenarios illustrates the difficulty of achieving 
stabilization of energy-related carbon emissions under the premises of population growth 
and economic development. Very massive restructuring of future energy systems alongside 
vigorous efficiency improvement efforts will be required to come close to such a global 
target. 
Methane Economy as a Bridge to Hydrogen 
The analysis of the methane economy scenario has demonstrated that it achieves sub- 
stantial carbon dioxide emissions reductions during the next century compared with al- 
ternative scenarios that rely more on other fossil energy sources in the future. As such 
the methane economy could make a significant contribution toward emissions reduction, 
but it is important to observe that most of the carbon dioxide would be originating from 
natural gas. Thus, further mitigation in this scenario would have to be focused on natural 
gas itself. This means that ways have to be investigated for limiting carbon emissions 
associated with natural gas use. 
There are basically two alternative approaches in reducing carbon dioxide emissions from 
methane use, one is to remove carbon after combustion and the other before. In the first 
case, the most promising technologies involve carbon scrubbing from flue gases. There 
are three main scrubbing processes that could be used: chemical and physical absorption, 
cryogenic distillation, and membrane separation (NakiCenoviC, 1993). Chemical absorp- 
tion process is widely used to remove SO, and NO, from flue gases and there are a few 
pilot plants with carbon dioxide removal by the same method. The various absorbents 
include potassium carbonate and amines. Scrubbing would clearly increase energy costs. 
The mono-ethanol-amine process would for example increase electricity costs by perhaps 
80 percent leading to carbon dioxide mitigation costs of about $140 per tC removed (Blok 
'Two methane forcing factors compared to carbon dioxide are used to encompass the range given in 
the literature, the high factor of 32 and low one of 16 (Victor, 1990). 
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et al., 1991 and NakiCenoviC, et al., 1993). The major problems associated with scrubbing 
are to reduce the costs and minimize losses in plant efficiency due to the energy spent in 
separating carbon dioxide from flue gases. Further, scrubbing processes are more suited 
for larger concentrations of carbon dioxide as in power-plant flue gases. They are less 
suited for distributed combustion of natural gas in individual homes and end-use devices. 
Thus, scrubbing would be applicable on larger-scales mostly in electricity generation. 
The other alternative would be to remove carbon from natural gas prior to consumption 
leaving hydrogen as the energy carrier. The basic process would involve methane steam 
reforming followed by a shift reaction and physical absorption or other separation of 
carbon dioxide. Hydrogen would then be transported to the user and converted to desired 
energy form, heat or work, without any carbon dioxide emissions. This is clearly a more 
elaborate mitigation strategy than carbon scrubbing, but it offers greater possibilities in 
the long run including a bridge to the "hydrogen" economy after the saturation in natural 
gas contribution to global energy supply. The strategy offers an evolutionary transition 
from current reliance on carbon-intensive mix of fossil fuels via methane to carbon-free 
energy system of distant future. 
Both scrubbing and removal pose the question what to do with accumulating amounts 
of carbon that is not released into the atmosphere. The amounts of carbon generated by 
scrubbing alone would be truly enormous. As was mentioned above, global emissions from 
energy-use amount to close to 6 GtC per year and electricity's share is about 2 GtC or 
about 7 GtCOz per year. The amount of carbon dioxide generated today in electric plants 
alone dwarfs all possible market demands. Thus, an important question is how such a 
large mass flow can be managed. There are two possibilities: to utilize carbon to the 
maximum degree possible in other activities, or to store the collected streams in perma- 
nent disposal sites. The possible uses include enhanced oil recovery, chemical feedstocks, 
building materials, carbonization of beverages, food conservation, sewage treatment, fer- 
tilizers in greenhouse horticulture, fire extinguishing equipment, and gas welding. Of all 
of these potential commercial uses of collected carbon dioxide only the first three provide 
permanent means of disposal, but the involved quantities would be limited compared with 
potential disposal requirements. 
Additionally, carbon dioxide may also be permanently stored in natural underground 
reservoirs, such as aquifers or depleted natural gas fields, or alternatively deposited in 
the deep ocean. It is difficult to estimate the quantities of accumulated carbon dioxide 
that could be stored in aquifers, gas and oil fields with any degree of certainty. The 
potential capacity might be as high as 750 GtC (NakiCenoviC et al., 1993). It is clear, 
however, that this is a rough estimate and not a practical storage capacity for future 
carbon emissions, but the orders of magnitude involved show that current levels of carbon 
emissions are storable at least during the next half a century or even longer. Thus, the 
storage potential is indeed large by any standards. 
In comparison, the potential for carbon disposal in the deep ocean is vast. The global 
carbon cycle involves the annual exchange of around 200 GtC between oceans, the atmo- 
sphere and the biosphere. The large amount of carbon is "storedn in the oceans and is 
estimated to be about 36,000 GtC. As the largest carbon reservoir on Earth, the deep 
oceans might be a possible repository for the sequestered carbon. There are various dis- 
posal schemes: to pump carbon dioxide in high-pressure pipes to the ocean floor, to inject 
liquid carbon dioxide at depths of about 3 km that would then continue to sink, to release 
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solid carbon dioxide (ice) that would sink by itself to the bottom, and to disperse carbon 
dioxide into a suitable thermohaline current that would carry it to the ocean bottom. 
The gist of the original proposal by Marchetti (1976) was to generate a 'gigamixern by 
injecting carbon dioxide into sinking thermohaline currents that eventually reach the deep 
ocean where the carbon dioxide enriched water might reside for thousands of years due 
to the slow natural mixing. The concrete proposal involved the Gibraltar subduction 
undercurrent that would provide a storage capacity of 10 GtC per year, easily exceeding 
all energy-related sources of carbon dioxide generated in the methane economy scenario 
during the next half a century. In a more practical scheme, carbon dioxide collected 
in continental Europe could be transported by pipeline for disposal a t  Gibraltar. The 
theoretical mitigation potential of this scheme is vast since there are other sinking ther- 
mohaline currents including the subduction currents of Bab-al-Mandab in the Red Sea, 
the Weddell Sea, and the North Atlantic. 
Clearly, all of these different schemes for storing carbon dioxide in either liquid or solid 
pools on the ocean floor or dissolved in the deep ocean still require concept proof before 
even a pilot project could be started. In any case, among the major outstanding uncer- 
tainties are the possible ecological effects of higher concentrations of carbon dioxide in 
the oceans and their effects on local chemistry in the vicinity of storage sites. 
The methane economy scenario with carbon removal offers the opportunity for achieving 
global energy decarbonization and eventually eliminating carbon emissions altogether. 
Thus, methane fulfills most of the obvious future requirements for becoming the major 
source of energy. A bonus is that the reliance on natural gas can pave the way for a 
very clean hydrogen future. Figure 10 illustrates the possibility and timing of such an 
evolutionary transition from fossil fuels to hydrogen (see also Veziroglu and Barbin, this 
volume). It shows the decarbonization in the world as the increasing ratio of hydrogen 
to carbon in the average energy mix. The data show the actual hydrogen and carbon 
content of global primary energy consumption as specified in Figure 10 for wood, coal oil 
and natural gas. The change in hydrogen to carbon ratio is presented as a "substitutionn 
process of hydrogen for carbon in the total primary energy consumption during the last 
century and as the continuation of this process in the future. The extrapolation in Fig- 
ure 10 shows that, after this century, the hydrogen-to-carbon ratio may exceed the level 
of four-to-one, that can be achieved by the pure methane, implying that some additional 
hydrogen would be needed to supplement the increasing reliance on methane. 
The possible way of both increasing the share of methane in global energy and hydrogen- 
to-carbon ratio is carbon removal and disposal. For example, methane could be separated 
into carbon dioxide and hydrogen in the proximity of the production site. This would re- 
quire the development of large scale steam reforming processes but is conceivable that the 
separation could be achieved economically. The separated carbon dioxide could be rein- 
jected into the depleted natural gas field or used for enhanced oil recovery and hydrogen 
could be piped like methane. Marchetti (1991) made such a proposal for Russian natural 
gas and hydrogen delivery to Europe and use of separated carbon dioxide for enhanced oil 
production in Ukraine. Initially, hydrogen could be added to the natural gas in the same 
pipeline and if required separated at consumption sites by membranes or other methods 
or simply used as mixture of methane and hydrogen. As the quantities of separated car- 
bon and hydrogen increase it might become necessary to build dedicated hydrogen and 
carbon dioxide pipelines. In the first stages of the hydrogen economy of the distant fu- 
ture, separated carbon might have to be deposited in the deep ocean as the fluxes become 
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Figure 10: Hydrogen-to-carbon ratio of global primary energy including historical data 
and future projection (Marchetti, 1982). 
too difficult to be absorbed by the declining oil production needs. Eventually, methane 
could be replaced as the source of hydrogen by carbon-free options, collectively called 
solfus (see Figure 6). Hydrogen and electricity would provide virtually pollution-free and 
environmentally benign energy carriers. To the extent that they might be produced from 
methane, the separated carbon would be contained within the energy sector or stored. 
As methane contribution to global energy needs saturates and subsequently proceeds to 
decline, carbon-free sources of energy would take-over eliminating the need for carbon 
handling and storage. 
Conclusion 
The findings in this paper confirm that energy gases could become means for reducing 
energy-related emissions of greenhouse gases. The issue of climate warming is likely to 
be a major planetary concern during the next century along with the needs to provide 
sufficient energy for further social and economic development in the world. Methane 
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and later hydrogen offer the possibility for reconciling these conflicting objectives. The 
findings show that evolutionary development of the global energy systems toward larger 
contribution of natural gas is consistent with the dynamics of the past 130 years. Contin- 
uation of this process in the future leads to carbon dioxide and methane emissions that 
are low compared with other, more conventional scenarios. The reasons for the moderate 
emissions associated with the emergence of the methane economy are that natural gas 
emits less carbon dioxide than other fossil fuels and that the scenario assumes zero-carbon 
sources of energy, collectively called solfus, to develop under the wing of gas and become 
major sources of energy by 2100. The current phase in the development of the global 
energy system may be just midway through the hydrocarbon era. Decarbonization in the 
world can continue as methane becomes the major energy source. From this perspec- 
tive, methane is the transitional hydrocarbon, and the great energy breakthrough that 
we must look, hope, and work for during the next decades is the production of hydrogen 
without fossil fuels (Ausubel et al., 1988). In the meantime, the natural gas share in total 
primary energy should continue to grow at the expense of dirtier energy sources - coal 
and oil. This transition to the methane age and beyond to carbon-free energy systems 
represents a minimum-regret option because it would also enhance the reduction of other 
adverse impacts of energy-use on environment in addition to substantial reductions of 
carbon dioxide emissions. 
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